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LOUISIANA LENDER LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of lender liability has caused considerable interest in
the legal community.' In these cases, borrowers sue lenders based on
unreasonable conduct in negotiating and enforcing loan agreements.
Borrowers seek not only to avoid repayment of loans, but also monetary
damages from the lender in claims founded upon tort and contract
principles.2
Suits involving claims of lender liability usually arise where a bank
or other lender sues a borrower to collect a delinquent loan. The
borrower countersues, claiming that the lender is liable to the borrower
because of some unfair conduct on the part of the lender. These suits
are common in the wake of aggressive lending policies adopted during
the agricultural and energy boom of the early 1980s.
The primary objective of this comment is to examine theories of
lender liability in light of the civil law. The discussion first briefly
examines current common law theories of lender liability. Next, Louis-
iana's application of these concepts is discussed. Finally, the paper
focuses on those theories of lender liability afforded by Louisiana's
system of civil law.
II. THEORIES OF LENDER LIABITY: A CORNERSTONE
The body of lender liability case law forms the basic starting point
for identifying current theories of lender liability.' These common law
theories of lender liability are very diverse. They include fraud,4 breach
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. "Lender liability" claims have become more frequent in response to lenders seeking
to collect loans. Although societal perspectives have often prevented this type of suit,
borrowers are suing lenders with more vigor. For a good primer on the subject, see Ebke
and Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 S.W. L.J.
775 (1986). See also Comment, Good Faith Theories of Lender Liability, 48 La. L. Rev.
1181 (1988).
2. Claims of lender liability are a hybrid of tort and contract principles. Although
many areas are based in tort, the most controversial is the allegation of a breach of
good faith and fair dealing. See Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
3. Some of the best known cases involving lender liability include State Nat'l Bank
of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) and KMC Co.
v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
4. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 661.
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of fiduciary duty,' duress, 6 tortious interference, 7 breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,' prima facie tort,9 negligence, 10
and statutory bases including the Internal Revenue Code," RICO,12 and
Federal Securities Laws.' 3
Many common law theories of lender liability differ slightly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the underlying principles of liability stem
from basic tort and contract law. 14 Historically, the civilian view of
contracts, consumer law,'5 and to some extent torts differs from the
common law.' 6 The relevant difference in Louisiana is primarily in the
consumer protection sector. Basically, the civil law protects consumers
5. Henkin, Inc. v. Berea Bank & Trust Co., 566 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
6. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 661.
7. In re American Lumber Co., 7 Bankr. 519 (D. Minn. 1979), aff'd, 5 Bankr. 470
(D. Minn. 1980).
8. First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
9. Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
10. Berkline Corp. v. Bank of Miss., 453 So. 2d 699 (Miss. 1984).
11. This cause of action involves a lender becoming involved with the payroll of a
borrower. If the lender fails to remit certain withholding taxes, it may be liable. See
I.R.C. §§ 3505(a) and (b) (1982), which state:
[I]f a lender ... who is not an employer ... pays wages directly to such
an employee . . . such lender . . . shall be liable in his own person . . . to the
United States in a sum equal to the taxes (together with interest) required to
be deducted and withheld from such wages by such employer.
12. See the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), which provides in § 1962:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt . . . to use or invest, directly, or indirectly, any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in,
or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
13. See the Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1982) which provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or
more other persons by or otherwise, controls any person . . . shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
14. See supra note 3.
15. See Hersbergen, Consumer Protection, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983, 44
La. L. Rev. 267 (1983).
16. Although Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 allows for the importation of common
law tort theory, the civilian view still differs. For example, Louisiana has only recently
adopted the old common law theory of tortious interference with contractual rights. See
9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
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more than the common law. This difference allows theories of lender
liability that are not available elsewhere to emerge in Louisiana. 17
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
A common allegation of lender liability involves the breach of a
fiduciary duty-a fiduciary relationship must develop between the parties
before liability can be imposed."8 The imposition of liability depends
largely upon the relative sophistication of the parties. 9 The lender usually
becomes a fiduciary when it has elicited or coerced the borrower's trust
and assumed a controlling position with regard to the debtor. Once
accorded fiduciary status, the lender is held to a standard whereby his
actions must not misuse this control. Misuse of this position may subject
the lender to a claim of lender liability.20
In the leading Louisiana case, Busby v. Parish National Bank,21 the
first circuit held that no fiduciary relationship arose between a borrower
and a lender even though the lender, knowledgeable in the area of Small
Business Administration loans, offered to "help" the debtors if the
S.B.A. denied the loan. 22 The first circuit reversed the jury's verdict of
$75,000 for the plaintiff.
The court looked at two considerations. First, the plaintiffs did not
fully indicate their expectancies as to what the bank's alleged "help"
meant. 23 Secondly, the court placed weight on the fact that the borrowers
were accompanied by counsel at meetings with bank officials. 24 The
court determined that the plaintiffs "could not justifiably rely on these
17. The abuse of rights doctrine and the special responsibilities under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2474 are two examples.
18. This duty encompasses more than a lender's ordinary duties of care, such as
crediting accounts and advising of the correct amount of money due. It develops when
a lender takes an active role in the business affairs of its customer.
19. Some bank/customer relationships are inherently fiduciary in nature. A dealer
floor-plan loan for a borrower involved in selling automobiles and mobile homes is an
example.
20. If a lender is accorded the status of a fiduciary and this duty is breached, the
claims of the debtor may be equitably subordinated to other creditors. See Note, Equitable
Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of
"Control," 65 Tex. L. Rev. 801 (1987).
21. 464 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
22. In addition to the offer of "help," the borrower also alleged that 1) the bank
led plaintiffs to believe the guaranty ratio it would propose to the Small Business As-
sociation (S.B.A.) would be 50/50 and 2) the bank represented that it would complete
an 1-4 form in connection with plaintiff's S.B.A. application, 464 So. 2d at 377.
23. The bank agent denied making this statement. Id. at 376.
24. The court may have been of the opinion that the presence of plaintiff's counsel
at the meeting with the bank was an indication that the parties were dealing at arm's
length.
1989l
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
statements as a commitment to provide a loan ' 25 and concluded that
"no fiduciary relationship existed between plaintiffs and the bank. ' 2 6
Strikingly, the court in Busby found "no basis in our law for the
imposition of a fiduciary duty upon the bank.' '27 This contradicts the
supreme court in Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, which declared that "article
2315 has been utilized by Louisiana courts to impose tort liability against
banks that have violated clear fiduciary duties to their customers.' '28
The fact that other Louisiana decisions recognize fiduciary relationships
may limit Busby. However, the language of Busby still exists as an
avenue to stifle potential fiduciary duty claims.
The large number of fiduciary duty cases across the country29 in-
dicates that litigation over fiduciary duties will surely be seen again, at
least at common law. As Louisiana courts become accustomed to this
cause of action in the lender liability arena, it may become a primary
basis for the imposition of a lender's liability in Louisiana.
B. Negligent Misrepresentation
Louisiana has recognized a cause of action for negligent misrepre-
sentation in suits involving lender liability.30 This cause of action is based
on Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316. In White v. Lamar Realty3 the
court stated that the code "affords a broad ambit of protection for
persons damaged by intentional and negligent acts of others" sufficient
to create a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.3 2 Further,
Josephs v. Austin33 noted that negligent misrepresentation "is in its
infancy in Louisiana. 3 a4 But, "it is a concept consistent with the policies
25. 464 So. 2d at 378.
26. Id. at 379.
27. Id.
28. 512 So. 2d 356, 364 (La. 1987) (Calogero, J. on rehearing). The court cited
Coburn v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 453 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) and State
Bank of Commerce v. Demco of La., Inc., 483 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986),
as authority.
29. See Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937) (very early
case finding a relationship of "trust and confidence"); Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So.
2d 923 (Fla. 1986) (finding a relationship of fiduciary duty on the part of a bank); and
Barrett v. Bank of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986) (finding
a "quasi-fiduciary" relationship).
30. This was another cause of action recognized by the court in Busby v. Parish
Nat'l Bank, 464 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
31. 303 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
32. Id. at 601. See also Devore v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 367 So. 2d 836 (La. 1979) and
Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 870
(1983).
33. 420 So. 2d 1181 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 870 (1983).
34. Id. at 1185.
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of the civil code." 35 This language indicates that the courts are more
sympathetic to this cause of action than to breach of fiduciary duty,
possibly because proving a fiduciary duty is a highly subjective under-
taking, while negligent misrepresentation is more concrete.
Basically, to succeed in a cause of action under negligent misrep-
resentation, the borrower must show that the lender has represented
some aspect of their relationship in a false and negligent manner. In
order to recover, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a legal duty on the part
of the defendant to supply correct information to the plaintiff; (2) a
breach of this duty; and (3) damages to plaintiff as a result of his
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.3 6
There is a split in Louisiana circuit courts as to whether the tortfeasor
(lender) must possess a pecuniary interest in the misrepresentation. Some
circuits require this element. For example, in Dousson v. South Central
Bell" the fourth circuit required a showing of the defendant's pecuniary
interest in the misrepresentation. 31 Yet, in Cypress Oilfield Contractors
v. McGoldrick Oi9 the third circuit made no mention of a pecuniary
interest requirement.4
Theoretically speaking, the phrase "pecuniary interest" may mean
either a conscious effort to obtain some financial gain or a circumstance
that exists independent of the will of either party. If the cause of action
is based on negligence, then requiring a pecuniary interest would seem
illogical, 41 because by definition a negligent tortfeasor does not plan his
actions. Furthermore, if this circumstance existed without the bank's
effort, then the bank will be sheltered by sheer luck: namely, the lack
of a pecuniary interest.
In Busby,42 the plaintiffs alleged that the bank's assurances of "help"
misled them into a feeling of security. The court, denying the plaintiff's
35. Id.
36. Busby v. Parish Nat'l Bank, 464 So. 2d 374, 377 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
37. 429 So. 2d 466, (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
38. The court relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 552, which states:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false in-
formation for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
or communicating the information.
39. 525 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
40. "In order for the doctrine to apply, three cumstances [sic] must occur: (1) there
must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to supply correct information; (2)
there must be a breach of that duty; and (3) the breach must have caused damages to
the plaintiff." 525 So. 2d at 1162.
41. Because negligence is a lack of care, the concept envisions no intent either to
do or not to do an act.
42. 464 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
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claim for negligent misrepresentation, noted that the plaintiffs "could
not have reasonably construed the allegations as an unqualified loan
commitment from the bank."'4 3 Furthermore, the court found that the
defendant did not rely on the plaintiff's assertion of this alleged "help." 44
The court did note, however, that the cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation did exist in Louisiana.
C. Fraud
Fraud is almost always included in the gumbo of allegations made
by the borrower. This is because fraud is "as versable as human in-
genuity." '4 Fraud is defined as a "misrepresentation or suppression of
the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage
for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other."
46
Allegations of fraud can also be used to obtain a trial by jury47 and a
finding of fraud entitles plaintiff to attorney's fees and damages. 48
Because of the remedies afforded successful claims of fraud, it is
not surprising that the courts are reluctant to find fraud on the part
of a lender.4 9 A simple, but classic example, Motors Insurance Company
v. Isadore,° provides a foundation. In this case, the lender's agent
fraudulently represented to the illiterate defendant that it was necessary
for him to sign a note, or lose his driver's license, as he was recently
involved in an auto accident." The court had little difficulty in finding
fraud on the part of the lender.5 2
A logical expansion of Isadore is to apply it to lenders who require
guarantees or additional mortgage agreements from the borrower. For
example, if a lender were to require a borrower to sign a larger guaranty,
mortgage, or loan commitment under some false pretense, fraud might
result. Often a false pretense develops when a lender threatens action
43. Id. at 378.
44. See text accompanying note 25.
45. Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967).
46. La. Civ. Code art. 1953.
47. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1732(2).
48. La. Civ. Code art. 1958.
49. "One who alleges fraud has the burden of establishing it by legal and convincing
evidence, since fraud is never presumed. To establish fraud, exceptionally strong proof
must be adduced." Sanders v. Sanders, 222 La. 233, 62 So. 2d 284 (1952); Fitch v.
Broussard, 156 So. 2d 127 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963). See also Motors Ins. Co. v. Isadore,
227 So. 2d 651, 653 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
50. 227 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
51. No mention was made as to why the bank required the note. Presumably, the
bank had financed the initial purchase of the auto and was left without collateral to
secure the debt to the uninsured Isadore.
52. "Our conclusion is that the note is void because of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion .... " 227 So. 2d at 653.
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that it has no right or intention to perform or when some other "trickery,
artifice, or device" is employed to induce the signature."
An examination of the recent Texas case State National Bank of
El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Company 4 provides insight as to how
a lender liability case of fraud may arise. The borrower was a family-
owned apparel manufacturer. Because of the losses, Mr. Farah was
replaced as chief executive officer. The banks amended their loan agree-
ments to include that any change in the executive management will be
an event of default on the outstanding loans. When Mr. Farah attempted
to be re-elected to the board, the banks threatened to call their loans."
The court found the lenders liable for fraud, duress, and interference
with corporate governance. As to the issue of fraud, the court held that
acceleration clauses cannot be used offensively, such as for commercial
advantage of the creditor, and do not permit acceleration where the
facts make it unjust or oppressive.",
III. LOUISANA LENDER LIABILITY
There are several areas of Louisiana law that offer potential basis
for liability on the part of a lender. These areas include classifying the
borrower as a consumer, abuse of rights, tortious interference with
business, and tortious interference with contract. Each will be discussed
in turn.
A. The Borrower As A Consumer
Louisiana, following the civilian tradition, has a policy of protecting
the consumer. 7 The supplier in Louisiana, to maintain good faith, has
an affirmative obligation to properly advise the consumer." This rule
recognizes that a seller usually has greater knowledge and sophistication
regarding a transaction than a buyer. Louisiana Civil Code article 2474
acknowledges this by requiring the seller to "explain himself clearly"
53. See Helmcamp v. InterFirst Bank, 685 S.W.2d 794, (Tex. Civ. App. 1985) (re-
presentations by an officer of a bank that "you will not lose a penny" created a basis
for fraud).
54. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
55. In fact, the lenders had no such intention. Id. at 664.
56. 678 S.W.2d at 667.
57. See 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 54, at 71-74, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975).
58. See Mixon v. Brechtel, 174 So. 283 (La. App. Orl. 1937) (finding that a "person
holding himself out . . . as skilled in any . . . trade is liable to [those] putting themselves
in his charge") and Hersbergen, Unconscionability: The. Approach of the Louisiana Civil
Code, 43 La. L. Rev. 1315 (1983).
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regarding "the extent of his obligations." 59 Furthermore, this article
provides that "any obscure or ambiguous clause is construed against
him."6°
In practice, the courts have interpreted this statute to mean the
more sophisticated supplier often must "affirmatively act as an advisor
to the consumer." ' 6' Louisiana has applied these rules, by analogy, to
a broad range of suppliers including a contractor, 62 a lessor,63 and even
a loan company 4 In these cases, the courts have acknowledged that
the more sophisticated party has an obligation to advise the less so-
phisticated party regarding the transaction.
Theoretically speaking, it is much easier to prove a lender's liability
under these articles because the lender, if more sophisticated, has an
affirmative duty to advise. 65 In practice, if the more sophisticated lender
does not advise, liability may be imposed upon it. On the other hand,
if the lender does advise, it may be developing an unwanted fiduciary
relationship. In fact, this area is fertile ground for developments in
lender liability because the civil law, unlike the common law, maintains
a strict adherence to the principle that the sophisticated party who does
not advise of potential defects should be responsible. 66 The extent of
the "defects" is, of course, unknown, but it may even encompass the
duty to inform the commercial borrower that the borrower's venture is
unsound.
59. La. Civ. Code art. 2774 reads:
The seller is bound to explain himself clearly respecting the extent of his
obligations: any obscure or ambiguous clause is construed against him.
60. La. Civ. Code art. 2056 and 2057 are also relevant. They state:
In case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a provision in a contact
must be interpreted against the party who furnished its text.
A contract executed in a standard form of one party must be interpreted, in
case of doubt, in favor of the other party.
In case of doubt that cannot be resolved, a contract must be interpreted
against the obligee and in favor of the obligor of a particular obligation.
Yet, if the doubt arises from a lack of necessary explanation that one party
should have given, or from the negligence or fault of one party, the contract
must be interpreted in a manner favorable to the other party, whether obligee
or obligor.
61. 43 La. L. Rev. at 1347, quoting Mixon v. Brechtel, 174 So. at 283.
62. Governor Claiborne Apts. v. Attaldo, 231 La. 85, 90 So. 2d 787 (1956),
63. Equilease Corp. v. Hill, 290 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
64. United Cos. Mtg. & Inv. v. Estate of McGee, 372 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1977).
65. For purposes of prescription, it is interesting to speculate whether an action under
this article is a tort or is a breach of a contract. See supra note 2.
66. The common law follows the maxim of caveat emptor.
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An interesting case in this area is Kunnes v. Bryant,67 in which a
homeowner sued a painter who had contracted to paint over a surface
that was previously painted with creosote. The painter did not inform
the homeowner that the result would not be satisfactory. The court
stated that "an expert painter should advise an owner as to the possibility
that an unsatisfactory result will be obtained. ' 6  However, the court
found that the homeowner knew from previous experience that the paint
probably would not seal. Consequently, it found the painter not liable.
In a lender liability context, this effect is best illustrated by the
discrepancy in the level of sophistication between a rural farmer (bor-
rower) and a banker (lender). The banker may be under an affirmative
duty to advise the borrower of, inter alia, what type of crop to plant.
But this places the lender in a precarious position. As noted before, if
the lender advises, it may be developing an unwanted fiduciary rela-
tionship. But if the lender fails to advise it may be liable Under the
stated provisions of the civil code. 69
While this basis of liability has yet to be litigated in the context of
a lender liability action, it has a sound basis in both legislation and
jurisprudence. Further, it provides a basis of a unique lender liability
action that is not found at common law.
B. Abuse Of Rights
The doctrine of abuse of rights affords another basis for a lender's
liability in Louisiana. 70 Closely akin to the common law theory of prima
facie tort, this action applies when a legal right is exercised without
benefit to the owner or with a purpose other than that for which it
was granted. 71 At common law, prima facie tort is a "lawful act un-
justifiably performed with an intent to harm another. '7 2
One of the most striking examples of this cause of action in a
lender liability context is the case of Centerre Bank v. Distributors,
67. 49 So. 2d 872 (La. App. Orl. 1951).
68. Id. at 874.
69. It would be interesting to see if a cause of action could be maintained against
a lender who knows that the borrower is unable to repay the sums loaned. Under this
theory, the lender, skilled in financial matters should advise the customer of his inability
to pay.
70. For a discussion of the common law counterpart, prima facie tort, see Maitland,
The Forms of Actions at Common Law 4-5 (1941); G. Alexander, Commercial Torts §
6.1 (1973); and Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 25 S. Ct. 3 (1904) (defining prima
facie tort as the intentional infliction of temporal damages.)
71. See Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1353 (La. 1977).
72. Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (finding
plaintiff had a cause of action in prima facie tort against an insurer which intentionally
stopped payment on a check).
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Inc.73 Although this case arises in Montana, it illustrates how this cause
of action is employed. The lender in Centerre was sued by the borrower
for wrongfully calling a $900,000 secured demand note. The lender,
apparently concerned with the decreasing value of the security and under
pressure from bank examiners, took possession of the security and the
accounts receivable of the borrower. The trial court ruled for the bor-
rower and awarded $3 million in damages. 74 The court of appeals re-
versed, citing a justifiable legitimate business interest to reduce losses
resulting from high risk loans. 75
Abuse of rights is an equitable doctrine. It provides a remedy where
another has exercised a "right" but has committed a "wrong" in so
doing. What is peculiar in a case of lender liability is that the lender
can actually exercise a right that it has, but still be liable if it is
unjustifiable and adverse to the borrower.
The factors that the court will apply in finding an abuse of rights
have been established as follows:
(1) The lender is exercising the right exclusively for the purpose
of harming the borrower, or the lender's predominate motive
is to cause harm;
(2) The lender has no serious and legitimate interest that is
worthy of judicial protection;
(3) The lender exercises the right in violation of moral rules,
good faith or elementary fairness; or,
(4) The lender exercises the right for a purpose other than that
for which the right was granted.7 6
It should be noted that there need be no showing of an intent to
harm. The doctrine of abuse of rights has been applied when there was
no serious and legitimate interest in the exercise of the right worthy of
judicial protection. 77
In State Bank of Commerce v. Demco of Louisiana,7 the court
examined the abuse of rights doctrine as applied to actions regarding
third parties by the lender. In that case, the debtor sought damages for
injury to its business and trade reputation allegedly brought on by a
73. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 55.
76. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009
(La. 1979); Mascro v. Wokocha, 489 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
77. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009 (La.
1979).
78. 483 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
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letter written by an officer of State Bank to one of Demco's debtors. 79
The court dismissed the demand based on abuse of rights pointing out
that the plaintiff admitted in his petition that the Bank had no right
to write the letter. The court reasoned that if the Bank had no such
right, "then by definition the theory of abuse of that right cannot
prevail.''80 It should be noted that the court did not dispute the existence
of the doctrine as applied to lenders, it simply found that it did not
apply in this case.
The courts appear to focus on the existence of a serious and le-
gitimate interest by the party exercising the right. Often, a lender has
a legitimate interest in protecting its stake in the loans advanced, or to
be advanced. This standard may be too difficult a burden for plaintiffs
to overcome.
C. Tortious Interference With Business
Louisiana courts have long recognized a cause of action .for inter-
ference with another's business relations."1 In the area of lender liability,
this basis may be utilized where a lender has influenced others not to
deal with the borrower. For example, if a lender has indicated to other
bank customers that a particular borrower is late in his loan payments,
this may be construed as being improper influence on the part of the
lender.8 2
Under the doctrine of tortious interference with business, "a party
must show that a defendant improperly and maliciously influenced others
not to deal with him.""3 The court in Sandoiph v. P & L Hauling
Contractors" recognized the rule that an entity "has an absolute right
79. The letter provided in pertinent part:
Please let this letter constitute a formal notice that your payment to Demco
La., Inc. for services rendered should be addressed, as you have done in the
past, to Demco, Inc. c/o State Bank of Commerce, P. 0. Box 1527, Slidell,
Louisiana, 70459.
It is our understanding that we have an assignment of their accounts receivable
and will look to you for damages for any losses suffered via failure to remit
your accounts payable as mentioned within the body of this letter.
80. 483 So. 2d at 1122.
81. Graham v. St. Charles St. R.R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707 (1895) (a
railroad foreman was held liable for instructing employees not to shop at corner grocery
store). See also McCoin v. McGehee, 498 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); Ustica
Enterprises v. Costello, 434 So. 2d 137 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
82. A "malicious and wanton" motive was required in Ustica Enterprises, 434 So.
2d at 140.
83. Muslow v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 509 So. 2d 1012, 1021, (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 512 So. 2d 1183 (1987).
84. 430 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
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to refuse to deal with another" but the right to influence others not
to deal is "not as broad." 85
Tortious interference with business is based on Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315. The policy behind this cause of action is protection of
business relations from the undue influence of third parties. It is difficult
to prevail in this cause of action because one must show not only intent,
but also actual interference. 6 Under this doctrine, it has been held that
a businessman is protected from malicious and wanton interference,
however, interference by actors with legitimate interests is permitted.8 7
In a lender liability case, the application of this doctrine is easily
envisioned. 8 Borrowers A and B are customers of Bank and of each
other. Bank has difficulty collecting from A, but collects promptly from
B. Bank advises B that A may be "having trouble." B stops dealing
with A. The dispositive question is whether B stopped dealing with A
because of Bank's communication. Bank may have an obligation, how-
ever, to advise B of its knowledge of A under the theory that a borrower
is a customer.8 9 If Bank so advises, it absolves itself of liability to B
but becomes liable to A for a breach of its fiduciary duty,90 and under
the doctrine of tortious interference with business.
Although the doctrine of tortious interference has not arisen in a
lender liability action in Louisiana, its broad applicability affords a
potential basis of liability in a broad range of facts.
D. Tortious Interference With Contract
Until now, no cause of action existed in this state for intentional
interference with contractual rights. 9' In fact, Louisiana has been the
only "American state that does not recognize the action for tortious
interference with contractual relations. "92 An action for intentional in-
85. Id. at 103.
86. Actual interference may result in a loss. Although intent may be present, if no
actual interference resulting in loss occurred, then the plaintiff will not prevail.
87. McCoin v. McGehee, 498 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
88. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 60 and 61.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
91. Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902), overruled by 9 to 5 Fashions,
Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989) (cause of action for tortious interference with
contract does not exist in Louisiana). Louisiana courts have hinted that they may be
willing to accept this cause of action for some time. See State Bank of Commerce v.
Demco of La., Inc., 483 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986); Sanborn v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc. 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984); and PPG Industries v. Bean Dredging, 447
So. 2d 1058, (La. 1984).
92. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
[Vol. 50
COMMENTS
terference with performance of contract by a third person, however, has
been recognized in the Second Restatement of Torts for years. 93
Overruling eighty-seven years of jurisprudence, the supreme court
recognized this cause of action in the recent case of 9 to 5 Fashions,
Inc. v. Spurney.94 A supplier of uniforms to the Louisiana World Ex-
position sued an officer of the exposition after it went bankrupt. The
supplier alleged that the officer was personally liable for failing to
appoint a coordinator between the fabric manufacturer and the fair.
The plaintiff claimed that these actions resulted in too much fabric
being ordered. The trial court awarded damages to the fabric company. 9
The appellate court reduced damages, but otherwise affirmed. 96 The
supreme court reversed the decision, but explicitly recognized a cause
of action for intentional interference with contractual rights.
In the arena of lender liability, a typical case arising under this
theory of liability would be as follows. 97 A is a borrower. Bank, in an
effort to protect its loan to A, states that unless A obtains permission
from Bank before paying other creditors, Bank will call its outstanding
loan. Not only may the borrower have a cause of action, but the creditors
who were not paid may have an action because their contractual relations
were impaired as well. 9
Although a lender may act to protect its legitimate financial interest,
this does not confer an absolute privilege to interfere with the debtor's
93. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977) reads:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other
from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.
94. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989). Tortious interference has significant ramifications in
the lender liability arena. Many cases have been litigated in other jurisdictions based on
this cause of action. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1984); Davis v. Lewis, 487 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), and Leonard
Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael Field & Co., 516 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Sterner
v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989), overruling Black Lake Pipe Line Co.
v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976).
95. $101,438 in damages were awarded.
96. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 520 So. 2d 1276 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
The court reduced damages to $45,308.
97. The facts of this hypothetical are taken largely from the case of Melmed v. Lake
County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984).
98. Usually, if the borrower goes bankrupt and the creditor is left unpaid, the creditor
may pursue his claim against the solvent party, the bank. See Note, Equitable Subordination
and Analogous Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of "Control," 65
Tex. 'L. Rev. 801 (1987).
19891
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
affairs. 99 Furthermore, at common law, an action based on interference
need not show that the interfering party acted with an intent to harm.
The plaintiff need only show that the acts were willful and intentional. l °°
As the newest cause of action in Louisiana, tortious interference
with contractual relations will surely be an area of much litigation. Well-
suited for claims of lender liability and backed by a tremendous number
of cases at common law, this cause of action promises to be at the
forefront of lender liability litigation in Louisiana.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is an abundance of theories at common law under which
claims of lender liability may be pursued. However, Louisiana law
recognizes some causes of action that the common law does not.
First, consumer protection laws provide a potent weapon with which
to pursue claims for borrowers who were not apprised of the risks
associated with the venture. Second, recognition of the doctrine of abuse
of rights allows borrowers to pursue actions for a lender's unjustified
actions. Third, the doctrine of tortious interference with business provides
an action to borrowers who were forced out of business. Finally, the
recent recognition of the doctrine of tortious interference with contract
illustrates the greater protection afforded borrowers.
Compared with other states, Louisiana has produced few decisions
involving lender liability. However, the principles and theories underlying
the civil law may provide protection equal to, if not greater than, that
found elsewhere. The future of lender liability in Louisiana, then, de-
pends largely upon the imagination and aggressiveness of the attorneys
who pursue or defend these claims.
Edward B. Kramer
99. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 690, (Tex. Civ. App.
1984).
100. Id. at 690.
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